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Findings and critiques – A review of recent evidence
Sangheon LEE*, Deirdre MCCANN*
and Nina TORM**
Abstract. This note provides an update on the ongoing debate over the World
Bank’s Doing Business project with a particular focus on its “Employing Workers”
index, which is intended to measure difficulty of hiring, rigidity of working hours and
difficulty of firing. The authors review the findings of studies that have used this
index or been influenced by it and of those that inspired its construction. They go on
to examine criticisms of this instrument, highlighting both conceptual and empirical
problems. Their paper concludes with suggestions for alternative approaches and
future research.
his note reviews a growing body of literature on the “Employing Workers”T index (EW index) developed by the World Bank as part of its “Doing
Business” indicators (DB indicators). This controversial project represents an
important attempt to measure “business regulations” and their enforcement
across 178 countries, and provide a guide for evaluating regulations that directly
impact on economic growth, allowing for cross-country comparisons and identi-
fication of good practice (World Bank, 2008). The key product of the DB project
is an “ease-of-doing business” index. It is made up of ten sub-indices including
the EW index, which measures the cost of labour market regulations. This index
is a composite indicator based on measures of three elements: difficulty of hir-
ing; rigidity of working hours; and difficulty of firing.1
Since the DB project was launched in 2004, the World Bank’s assessment
of existing regulations in developing countries has been predominantly negative.
Rigid labour market policies are blamed for poor labour market performance,
such as low productivity, high unemployment and informal employment, while a
more flexible regulatory framework is perceived to be associated with increased
growth and employment creation. In a sense, then, this project can be under-
stood as providing an empirical basis for the “augmented Washington Consen-
sus” (Rodrik, 2005), which attributes much of the failure of the “Washington
Consensus” in developing countries to the rigidity of their labour markets.
1 * Senior Researchers, Conditions of Work and Employment Programme, International
Labour Office, Switzerland. A research network on Regulating for Decent Work has been estab-
lished to develop alternative perspectives on labour market regulations. Interested researchers can
obtain further details by email from lees@ilo.org or mccann@ilo.org. ** Researcher, Develop-
ment Economics Research Group (DERG), University of Copenhagen, Denmark. The authors
are grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. We remain, however, respon-
sible for any errors.
Responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles rests solely with their authors and
publication does not constitute an endorsement by the ILO.
1 For details, see the Doing Business web site: http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
Notes, debates and communications 417The pioneering nature of the EW index and its strong policy implications
have inspired a growing literature examining the effects of labour market regu-
lations on employment and growth performance, particularly in developing and
transition countries. The index has also been subject to strong criticism from
trade unions, academics, lawyers and others who question both the orthodox
presumption that unregulated labour markets produce better employment out-
comes and the methodological foundations of the DB approach.
The remainder of this note is constructed as follows. First, it reviews the
findings of studies that use the EW index and Doing Business database for analy-
sis and also those that inspired the index or were influenced by it. The focus is on
the impacts of labour regulations on employment, investment and other macro-
economic variables. The paper then looks at the critiques of the index with
respect to both conceptual and empirical problems. It concludes with a summary
of this literature review and some suggestions for future research.
The Employing Workers index: What have the empirical
studies found?2
Impacts on employment performances
The study by Botero et al. (2004) that developed the methodology for the EW
index concluded that stronger regulation of labour is associated with lower
labour force participation and higher unemployment, especially among young
workers. Since then, the case for deregulation has drawn support from a number
of empirical studies.3 For instance, drawing on cross-country evidence, Micco
and Pagés (2004) adopted the methodology of Botero et al. (2004) to argue that
more stringent job-security regulations slow down gross job flows, especially in
sectors that require higher levels of labour flexibility. The UNDP (2004) report,
Unleashing Entrepreneurship, which is largely based on the Doing Business
report of 2004, finds rigid employment regulations to be related to higher female
unemployment. On this basis, the report argues that developing countries
should do away with excessively complex labour regulations in favour of simpler
rules with higher levels of enforcement. Schiantarelli (2005) suggests a positive
effect of less stringent regulation on productivity growth, while Djankov,
McLiesh and Ramalho (2006) argue that an improvement in business regula-
tions could lead to GDP increases of up to 2.3 per cent. Czeglédi (2006) observes
that countries which regulate more tend to be poorer and grow more slowly,
while those regulating less but more coherently have higher levels of develop-
ment. Examining specific components of regulation, Poschke (2007) finds
that firing costs discourage exit of low-productivity firms, congesting the selec-
tion process and slowing down growth, and notes that this effect is stronger the
2 Only the papers which used or influenced the DB indicators are reviewed. Other relevant
papers on the impacts of labour regulations are mentioned in footnotes.
3 See Djankov (2007) for a recent review of this literature.
418 International Labour Reviewmore variable the firm’s productivity is. Similarly, Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and
Schweiger (2008) argue that stringent hiring and firing regulations distort job
flow patterns and thus have an important adverse impact on allocative effi-
ciency, productivity levels and growth.4
As regards country-level studies, Heckman and Pagés (2004) draw on a
methodology similar to the EW index to conclude that, in the case of Latin
America, labour market regulations represent an inequality-increasing mech-
anism, and that it is generally young, uneducated and rural workers who lose out.
These findings are supported by Basu and Maertens (2007), who draw on the
EW index to argue that labour regulations constitute one of the main barriers to
further economic growth in the Indian economy. Their paper contends that
reforms are needed and recommends a labour market system characterized by
flexible contracts, a minimal welfare safety-net for unemployed workers, and
capacity for swift dispute resolution.5 The studies on Brazil by Almeida and Car-
neiro (2005a and 2005b) find that increased flexibility and easier access to infor-
mal labour are generally associated with higher levels of output and value-added
per worker. Their argument is that informal employment is an important source
of unregulated labour, which may allow firms to operate more efficiently. In the
case of Mexico, Mehrez (2005) argues that the large informal sector and
the associated externalities and distortions in the economy are attributable to
the rigidity of the labour market, measured in terms of the minimum wage,
length of the working day and overtime pay.
The relationships between regulation, growth, the informal sector and cor-
ruption form the basis of a number of studies. For instance, Loayza, Oviedo and
Servén (2004 and 2005a) present evidence that high levels of labour market
regulation are associated with lower growth and an expansion of informality.
Dreher and Schneider (2006) find that stricter labour regulation is positively
associated with corruption and the shadow economy, while better law enforce-
ment shrinks the informal sector. Their paper also notes that in high income
countries, corruption and the shadow economy tend to be substitutes, whereas
in low income countries they are complements, a finding that may have interest-
ing implications for regulatory policy.6 Similarly, a recent study by Dabla-Norris
and Inchauste (2008) finds that reducing regulatory constraints increases the
4 Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2008) also reported their experimental results that firing
threats are crucial for market efficiency, but argued that greater flexibility in contractual instru-
ments (e.g. bonus pay) may undo the negative effects of dismissal barriers. The exact impact of fir-
ing threats therefore depends on the institutional environment.
5 Also on India and based on national data sources, a study by Besley and Burgess (2004)
concludes that labour regulation has resulted in lower employment, investment and productivity
in the formal manufacturing sector, while output in the informal sector has increased. The study
also finds little evidence that labour market regulations have promoted the interests of workers,
suggesting an association with increases in urban poverty.
6 Based on the firm-level data from the World Bank, Hallward-Driemeier and Helppie
(2007) also find that while higher levels of regulation, discretion and corruption are associated with
firms using more flexible labour arrangements, the extent of this actually declines with increased
regulation.
Notes, debates and communications 419benefits to firms of participating in the formal sector and lowers their incentives
to operate informally.
Impacts on investment and enterprises
Another strand of the regulation literature examines the multiple linkages
between labour market institutions, growth, the investment climate and entre-
preneurship. For example, Hallward-Driemeier and Stewart (2004) find that a
reduction in regulation improves the investment climate, leading to increased
productivity, investment and job growth in particular for smaller firms. Also on
Latin America, Loayza, Oviedo and Servén (2005b) argue that labour, product-
market and fiscal regulations affect aggregate performance negatively through
firm entry and exit, a result supported by Oviedo’s study (2006), which also
points to unpredictability of regulation as an important source of inefficiency in
the factor reallocation process.7 A European Commission (2004, chapter 5)
study points out that labour market reforms have both direct and indirect pro-
ductivity impacts, with the former consisting of decreasing costs of doing busi-
ness and the removal of barriers to penetration of new markets, and the latter
operating through higher levels of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency.
Similarly, Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2005) find that increased levels of labour
regulation are associated with reduced entry and exit, smaller average firm size,
and greater distortion in firm-size distribution.
Also on firm characteristics, Jacobs and Coolidge (2006) suggest that
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating on the fringe of the for-
mal market are particularly sensitive to a high-cost regulatory environment and
are therefore likely to be key beneficiaries of regulatory reforms. Van Stel,
Storey and Thurik (2006) argue that labour market regulations lower entrepre-
neurship rates,8 and Klapper et al. (2007) suggest significant positive linkages
between the quality of regulatory environments and levels of entrepreneurship.
Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) suggest that overly ambitious labour regulations
raise labour costs and curb incentives for firms to hire more workers and adopt
new technologies, which in turn reduces the reallocation of labour to productive
jobs in the formal economy. However, their study also points out that these
effects differ according to firm type and size, and that employers often make use
of on-the-job training and temporary employment measures to compensate for
stringent employment protection legislation. These findings are echoed in their
later paper (Pierre and Scarpetta, 2007), which notes that labour market reforms
may not succeed unless accompanied by improvements in social protection
mechanisms that cushion adjustment costs for workers. Ardagna and Lusardi
7 An earlier study by Oviedo (2004) compared the experiences of eastern Europe, the
OECD and Latin America and concluded that the reason Latin America benefited less from regu-
latory change than the transition countries is that the pace of reform was not sufficient to generate
significant differences in firm dynamics.
8 It should be noted that this finding is based on the assumption that country differences in
regulations are stable across different firm sizes, which puts into question the reliability of the
results.
420 International Labour Review(2008) argue that regulation is detrimental to entrepreneurship, especially
through its impact on social networks, business skills, and working status. How-
ever, their study also finds that regulation strengthens the impact of attitudes
toward risk.
Impacts on macroeconomic performances
Another group of studies focuses on the relationship between regulation, trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI). Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004) suggest
that as the labour market in a host country becomes more flexible, FDI may
increase by as much as 18 per cent. This effect is suggested to be particularly
strong in transition economies and more significant for investments in the ser-
vice sector than in manufacturing. Similarly, Busse and Groizard (2006) find evi-
dence that excessive regulation restricts growth by lowering levels of FDI. With
regard to trade, Bolaky and Freund (2005) find that in heavily regulated
countries the effect of trade on long-run growth is non-existent at best and nega-
tive at worst and associated with a lower standard of living. Loayza and Raddatz
(2006) find that improvements in labour market flexibility lessen the negative-
output impact of terms-of-trade shocks, while in rigid labour markets domestic
financial robustness may help reduce the effect of external shocks. Borrmann,
Busse and Neuhaus (2006) find that countries with excessive regulations and
low-quality institutions have been unable to take full advantage of trade liberal-
ization and conclude that reforming regulatory frameworks is essential to
achieving positive welfare gains from trade and FDI inflows. Supporting this
finding, Helpman and Itskhoki (2007) conclude that countries with less “labour
market friction” gain more from trade, but they also note that differences in
unemployment rates associated with trade do not necessarily reflect differences
in rigidity levels. Cuñat and Melitz (2007) present evidence that countries with
more flexible labour markets have a comparative advantage in sectors where the
ability to adjust is more important, e.g. sectors subject to high-variance shocks.
They also suggest that a rigid economy can be improved by liberalizing trade and
importing flexibility from a more flexible trading partner, rather than labour
market deregulation.
The critiques: Problems with the premises of the EW index
As the previous section indicates, the EW index has had a significant influence
on labour research. It has also been influential in labour market policy debates,
particularly in developing and transition countries. However, critiques of the
index have also increased in number and intensity. In the early work, critics did
not subject the EW index to empirical testing, tending instead to concentrate on
its foundations, which had been broadly accepted in the empirical studies.
Critics have been particularly concerned with the use of the EW index – and in
particular the country rankings – to guide legal reform, as a benchmark against
which to measure progress and a basis for providing financial assistance to devel-
oping countries. The focus of the critiques, then, was conceptual and methodo-
Notes, debates and communications 421logical rather than the econometrical “robustness” of the indices. In recent
years, however, the critiques of the DB project have broadened to encompass
empirical tests that are based on new data and analysis. This section reviews both
of these strands of the research.
Conceptual and measurement problems
The conceptual and methodological foundations of the EW index and broader
DB project are challenged in the literature as problematic or unreliable.9 The
conceptual limitations of the project can be argued to stem from its underlying
understanding of labour laws, which are grouped together with the other legal
measures covered by the index as a form of “business regulation”. This conceptu-
alization of labour standards differs from conventional accounts of their purpose
in policy, legal and other discourses, which tend to centre on the social objectives
of such standards, e.g. ensuring justice, protecting workers’ well-being and secur-
ity, or improving the quality of life of workers and their families.10
In line with this classification of labour laws as an element of “the business
environment”, the DB indicators are intended neither to recognize the social
objectives of labour regulations, nor to assess the level of protection offered by
the domestic standards they cover. As a result, a key concern that has been
raised by both trade unions and researchers is that, aside from the ILO’s core
labour standards,11 the EW index disregards many of the entitlements contained
in ILO standards.12 For example, Lee and McCann (2008) have carried out an
analysis with respect to the international standards on working time, finding the
sub-index on “rigidity of hours” to be substantially in conflict with them. Also,
the 2008 DB report singles out Georgia as a model of labour market regulation
(World Bank, 2008, p. 19), although its labour code has been heavily criticized by
the ILO for granting employers an unlimited right to dismiss workers without
cause and imposing severe restrictions on trade union action and workers’ col-
lective bargaining rights.
In terms of the overall country rankings, moreover, the EW index gener-
ates some striking results that are, in some cases, out of line with the economic
outcomes it purports to measure. Because of their deregulated labour markets,
countries like Afghanistan, Haiti and Papua New Guinea, for example, earn
higher marks on the index than do prosperous economies with low levels of
unemployment and high productivity, such as Finland, the Netherlands and
Sweden, contradicting the World Bank’s claim that more flexible policies are a
9 See, for instance, Kitching (2006), Arruñada (2007 and 2008), Berg and Cazes (2007) and
Lee and McCann (2008) for recent critiques, and Djankov’s (2008) response.
10 On the objectives underlying the international labour standards, for example, see Langille
(2005) and Murray (2001).
11 These standards are enunciated in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work. They cover standards on freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing, forced and child labour, and workplace discrimination.
12 The 2008 DB report claims that methodological improvements have aligned the EW index
with the ILO’s Conventions (for more detail, see Doing Business, 2008, p. 68).
422 International Labour Reviewrecipe for high-quality job creation. In this context, Global Unions has suggested
that by discouraging countries from maintaining anything above the bare min-
imum level of labour market regulation, the DB project undermines the devel-
opment goals promoted by international organizations, including the World
Bank itself (ITUC/Global Unions, 2007, p. 2).
Detailed analyses of individual indicators shed light on such outcomes and
raise questions about a number of the sub-indices and legislated standards that
are absent from the evaluation. Examination of the “rigidity of hours” sub-
index, for example, shows it to be broadly out of step with trends in domestic reg-
ulation and also to reward substantially deregulated working time regimes (Lee
and McCann, 2008). McLeod (2007) argues that the “rigidity of employment”
component of the EW index provides no additional information: its only effect,
he suggests, is to introduce a bias towards the interests of employers by adding
weight to the “hiring”, “firing” and “rigidity of hours” sub-indices. And Berg
and Cazes (2007) point to the absence from the Index of tripartite negotiation
and collective bargaining measures, despite their role in encouraging dynamic
and responsive labour markets.13
The literature also questions the models of “the business” and “the
worker” that are applied to evaluate labour legislation for the purposes of
the DB index.14 Assumptions about “the business” include, for example, that it
is a limited liability company; operates in the manufacturing sector; and has
201 employees. A number of studies have noted that this model of the firm does
not represent the bulk of the private sector in many developing countries, most
notably because it misses the micro-enterprises that are characteristic of the
informal sector.15 In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, Kitching
(2006) has argued that since the DB project assumes a model of the enterprise
atypical of the vast majority of micro- and small enterprises, it is unable to offer
meaningful information on any growth constraints that may affect these busi-
nesses. The image of “the worker” embedded in the index is also open to criti-
cism as reflecting the “standard” model of labour market participation in that he
or she is assumed to be 42 years old, engaged on a full-time basis and to have
been employed by the same company for 20 years. This model of engagement in
paid labour, however, is alien to many workers – and women in particular –
across the industrialized countries, and it captures only a minority of workers in
many developing countries.16
Along the same lines, Siems (2007) argues that by comparing countries in
which the context of particular rules is completely different, the DB approach
13 See also du Marais (2006), Association Henri Capitant des amis de la culture juridique
Française (2006) and McLeod (2007).
14 On the methodology of the EW index, see http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology
Surveys/EmployingWorkers.aspx (accessed 5 September 2008).
15 See Palmer, Wedgwood and Hayman (2007), Berg and Cazes (2007) and UNIDO/GTZ
(2008).
16 On the regulation of precarious forms of work in industrialized economies, see Fudge
and Owens (2006). 
Notes, debates and communications 423does not allow for an assessment of individual countries’ legal systems, thereby
undermining the overall ranking system. Bath’s (2007) study of the application
of the index to China and Australia contends that the restricted scope of the EW
index means that the overall DB index does not provide an accurate picture of
“ease of doing business”, thereby restricting its usefulness both for analyses
of individual countries and for cross-country comparisons. Also, questioning
whether the EW index accurately captures the employment climate best suited
to business, Høyland, Moene and Willumsen (2008) argue that countries may
actually find it easier to shift their rankings in the index than to change their
underlying business environment. This supports the suggestion of Ménard and
du Marais (2006) that the DB ranking system is superficial and measures the
ability of countries to “fix the rules of the game”. Overall, the current state of
knowledge on the workings of labour legislation does not validate the belief that
labour law reform towards deregulation will enable countries to improve their
economic performance (Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). These conceptual and
methodological deficiencies of the EW index stand in contrast with the increas-
ing references being made to it within global policy circles, raising suspicion in
some quarters that the main motivation behind the EW index is international
trade goals – e.g. global competition for labour deregulation – rather than ques-
tions of national development (Villalba, 2006).
With regard to the measurement of legislative prescriptions, a number of
studies have made the point that the EW index is based on de jure regulatory
policies, and that since these do not necessarily reflect de facto practices, the
ability of the EW index to assess the economic impact of specific legal instru-
ments is limited.17 Chor and Freeman (2005), for example, find no correlation
between the EW index and the corresponding measure in their Global Labour
Survey, namely, the index on “Employment Regulations and Working Condi-
tions”, which is based on the de facto application of regulations. They conclude
that the measurement of de jure regulations does not provide a reliable indica-
tion of workplace practice. Similarly, Lee and McCann (2008) construct an index
of effective regulation intended to capture both the de jure and the de facto per-
spectives: they find substantial cross-country variations in the relation between
working time regulation, income and the observance of legal measures. Eifert’s
(2007) study, which finds that de jure regulatory reform over the period 2003–06
did not significantly boost aggregate investment or employment (at least in the
short run), also lends support to the view that one should be cautious about using
the existing institutional indicators to make causal claims about the impact of
regulatory reforms (see also Benjamin and Theron, 2007, on South Africa).
17 See among others Jacobs and Coolidge (2006), Chor and Freeman (2005), du Marais
(2006) and Lee and McCann (2008). In the case of Viet Nam, this limitation is raised by the Viet
Nam Provincial Competitiveness Index (VPCI), which attributes the difference between the out-
comes of the DB index and the VPCI to the fact that the DB ranking is based on de jure policies
whereas the VPCI focuses on whether the regulations are faithfully implemented (see USAID/
VCCI, 2007).
424 International Labour ReviewBenefits of labour regulations
As alluded to in the previous section, a further critique that has been directed at
the EW index centres not on its inability to capture the social goals of labour
market regulation, but instead on its failure to recognize and measure the ways
in which labour laws can generate positive economic outcomes. In this regard,
the index is criticized for assuming that deregulated markets foster economic
growth and for embodying indicators that measure the level of deregulation
rather than accurately capturing the relationship between legal measures and
economic outcomes.
The labour law literature offers accounts of how labour regulation can
advance economic goals, outlining a role for labour standards in generating
positive economic outcomes, particularly by enhancing dynamic efficiencies.
Recent work has provided theoretical justifications for regulating work in which
economic efficiency considerations complement the traditionally dominant
social objectives (see, in particular, Deakin and Wilkinson, 1991 and 2000). This
work offers a model for understanding how labour standards can generate long-
term economic gains by protecting the interests of firms that adopt a high-
productivity route to competitiveness, i.e. by preventing other firms from com-
peting against them on the basis of poor working conditions. Regulatory meas-
ures thereby “channel” competition away from the unacceptable treatment of
workers into other sources of competitive advantage, such as technological,
organizational or managerial innovation. Similarly, Kitching (2006) argues that
it is important to consider both the direct and the indirect impacts of regulations,
noting that they may also enable and motivate business owners, rather than sim-
ply constrain them.
Moreover, a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that relatively
substantial regulation does not necessarily lead to weaker labour market out-
comes. Bertola (2005 and forthcoming) – one of the first to question the
premises of the EW index – casts doubt on the view that all labour market regu-
lations have adverse employment and welfare effects. Similarly, Arpaia and
Mourre (2005) argue that the costs and benefits of regulation change over time
and that regulation per se cannot be considered a hindrance to the flexible work-
ing of the labour market. The importance of the specific country-context is high-
lighted in several studies, including Oviedo’s (2004) comparative assessment of
eastern European, OECD and Latin America countries. The UNIDO/GTZ
(2008) report on sub-Saharan Africa also finds little evidence that “inappropri-
ate” labour regulations are a significant constraint on growth, pointing to the
shortage of skilled labour as a much more serious limitation. Moreover, as
regards the Middle East and North Africa, a recent World Bank (2007) report
finds that for this region’s countries as a whole, regulatory frameworks do not
impose a constraint on business. Nor does the study by Jha and Golder (2008) on
India find any evidence that protective labour market interventions are a hin-
drance to development. The authors also note that in order to understand output
or employment performance a whole range of variables must be considered in
addition to labour laws.
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(2006) finds no evidence that protective labour market institutions are associ-
ated with adverse growth and development outcomes. Their study notes that
unemployment benefit generosity might be an exception, although the direction
of causality is questioned. Similarly, Blanchet (2006) finds no obvious relation
between increased employment flexibility and higher levels of human develop-
ment and other macroeconomic variables. His study argues that using composite
indicators to rank countries may be misleading and concludes that the DB index
explains very little in terms of the variations of macroeconomic variables across
countries. Moreover, a couple of recent studies – by Commander, Svejnar and
Tinn (2008) and Commander and Svejnar (2008) use the World Bank’s Enter-
prise Surveys dataset and the DB database to show that improvements in the
EW index (and in the overall DB index) do not seem to be related to GDP
growth or higher levels of employment. The authors attribute these results both
to the manner in which the DB indicators are measured and to the complexity of
the underlying relationships. They conclude that “country-fixed effects” may be
more important in explaining firm performance than differences in institutional
environments.
In more general terms, as Arruñada (2007) has pointed out, in spite of the
lack of attention paid by the DB index to the potential benefits of protective
labour market regulation, there is growing evidence that regulation may entail
both economic and social benefits. Loayza, Oviedo and Servén (2005a), for
instance, point to the potentially positive impact of regulation on social object-
ives such as workers’ safety and welfare; and a study by McCann and Lee (2007)
suggests ways in which working time regulation can be designed to contribute to
economic efficiency. Kiliçaslan (2005) finds that regulations on conditions of
employment, labour administration and training may bring about increased pro-
ductivity, while wage flexibility appears to be detrimental to growth in manufac-
turing. On the application of labour law in micro- and small- enterprises,
Fenwick et al. (2007) suggest that regulation can play an important role in pro-
moting job quality, stabilization and growth. Similarly, a recent ILO study on
Ghana suggests that regulations can benefit employers by facilitating productiv-
ity gains, concluding that repealing labour legislation will not necessarily ensure
business sustainability (GEA/ILO, 2008).
Moreover, in relation to firing costs, Bird and Knopf (forthcoming) find
that the costs imposed upon employers by “wrongful discharge” laws (in the
form of increased labour expenses and lower profitability) appeared only during
the first year after their adoption and may not be as high as implied by the EW
index. Almeida and Aterido (2008) also find a positive correlation between the
enforcement of labour regulations and investment in job training, especially in
the manufacturing sector and among low-tech industries. Their study notes that
this effect works mostly through the rigidity and cost of hiring regulations rather
than legal provisions on the firing of workers.
Finally, a related point, often raised by trade unions, is that by focusing
solely on the costs of regulation, the EW index does not consider the costs of
426 International Labour Reviewlabour market deregulation, notably in regard to social security (Bakvis, 2006).
Also on this issue, and in response to the UNDP (2004) report on Unleashing
entrepreneurship, Trebilcock (2006) notes that the study fails to address the con-
sequences of reduced social protection associated with deregulatory reform, and
does not question the relationships between specific labour law measures and
the incidence of poverty.
Concluding remarks: The way forward –
getting the basics right?
The observed conceptual shortcomings and methodological limitations of the
EW index suggest that using it to derive conclusions about overall labour market
rigidities may not simply lead to dubious outcomes but may even be highly mis-
leading. In addition, the rather simplistic claim that regulation is an obstacle to
economic growth and development, which is based on the assumption that regu-
lation entails only costs, has been called into question by evidence pointing to
the potential benefits of regulation.
Based on the empirical evidence reviewed in this note, the effects of labour
market institutions appear to be more complicated than implied by the DB
approach. A more realistic approach might therefore be to allow for country
variations in coverage and implementation of labour laws, considering both
direct and indirect impacts of these regulations, and recognizing that the balance
of their costs and benefits may change over time. The complexity of the regula-
tion-employment relationship arises from the fact that labour institutions are
embedded in social norms and systems of production and often form part of
complementary laws and policies. For instance, as is noted by McCann, many
of the labour rights extended to workers in the Asian region were enacted as
part of democratization processes (see McCann, 2008).
Our literature review indicates that the current understanding of labour
regulation and its impacts on economic and labour market performances may
not be sufficient to develop a policy guideline of universal applicability. The
problem appears to begin with the basics. The assumption underlying the EW
index is that labour regulation is the outcome of the rent-seeking activities of
“insiders”. In this understanding, as Lindbeck and Snower (2001) suggest, the
focus tends to be on “unequal power” among workers, with the deregulatory
policy measures intended to reduce the influence of “insiders”. This approach
has the effect of shifting away from “labour regulation as a way of addressing the
relationship between workers and employers” and concentrating on a rather
secondary aspect of labour regulation, such as potentially different interests
between workers. It also has the effect of supporting the neo-classical view that
labour regulation introduces distortions into otherwise efficient markets.
This unbalanced understanding, as discussed above, has led institutional
indicators such as the EW index to be designed without consideration of the
potential benefits of regulation. As Agell (2004) has pointed out, “[t]he intellec-
tual support … for far-reaching labour market deregulation … can be traced to
Notes, debates and communications 427investigations that assume … a perfectly competitive labour market. Though
such an approach might be useful in mapping out the costs of labour market
institutions, it has nothing to say about potential benefits” (p. 260). As a result, in
economic studies of labour regulation, the analysis “has been mostly conducted
within a framework that does not justify its existence” (Pissarides, 2001). How-
ever, it is equally difficult to say that the benefits of labour regulation are well
understood and effectively measured by its supporters. As noted earlier, there
have been some attempts to demonstrate these positive aspects, but the concep-
tual framework remains relatively weak and does not extend beyond the “mar-
ket failure” argument. Relevant measurement work is also lacking. A central
limitation of these studies, for example, is that they are restricted to outlining the
economic impacts of legal measures, rather than offering a detailed analysis of
the conditions from which these emerge.18
Significantly, the realization that the relationship between regulation,
employment and growth is more complex than assumed by existing institutional
indicators appears to be gaining ground, even among proponents of deregulation.
For instance, Mehrez (2005), Oviedo (2006) and Dabla-Norris and Inchauste
(2008) all note the importance of the quality of regulation in curbing its poten-
tially negative effects and the potential for improved enforcement of legal stand-
ards to reduce the “shadow economy” and address corruption. As recent studies
imply, the interactions between different institutions and policies may be criti-
cally important in determining the nature and scale of their respective impacts on
labour market outcomes (e.g. between minimum wages and taxation, or employ-
ment protection laws and training), but the current understanding of such institu-
tional interaction is very limited and no firm conclusion can be drawn as yet (see
Bertola, forthcoming, for a review; Bassanini and Duval, 2006).
All in all, then, there is a growing recognition that regulation must be
evaluated in a comprehensive context that captures how specific legal rights and
obligations are articulated within the broader legal systems and policy contexts
in which they are embodied. This attentiveness to the policy measures needed to
accompany and support regulatory reform allows a more sophisticated under-
standing of the package of policy measures that are required for legal measures
to advance economic outcomes. In this regard, individual country case-studies
or comparative studies that take into account structural and political frame-
works may provide a more accurate assessment than cross-country examin-
ations. In particular, this approach would allow specific development contexts to
be considered in a more explicit manner. As indicated above, for example, in the
many African countries where only a small share of the workforce is employed
in the formal sector, “formalization” rather than “deregulation” of the labour
market may constitute a key policy priority.
18 An exception is Bosch and Lehndorff’s (2001) review of the employment effects of col-
lective working-time reductions in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, which offers a model of a
more sophisticated analysis. Their study considers not only the economic impacts of regulatory
measures but also the conditions in which beneficial impacts are more likely to emerge.
428 International Labour ReviewThe foregoing review suggests that the developing world would probably
gain more from the debate on regulation if it were to shift from a focus on
whether to deregulate towards a consideration of how individual countries can
best promote labour laws and policies that respond to their current development
challenges. Within the legal literature, for example, promising avenues of recent
scholarship question how legal techniques can be redesigned or enhanced to
realize their goals more readily. This work draws on advances in regulatory
theory to explore how labour rights can be advanced in more effective ways than
by conventional “command and control” mechanisms alone, through new or
overlooked regulatory techniques such as financial incentives, government con-
tracts, codes of practice, etc. (see, in particular, Fenwick et al., 2007).19 This work
also offers a promising avenue towards focusing not so much on a retreat from
substantive legal standards, as on the design of procedural and implementation
mechanisms to ensure that legal rights are realized in practice, and on identifica-
tion of the most effective combinations of regulatory techniques to advance both
social and economic objectives.
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